The prospect of using cell-based interventions to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause (...) for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment. (shrink)

What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words.

It has been widely argued that words are analogous to species such that words, like species, are natural kinds. In this paper, I consider the metaphysics of word-kinds. After arguing against an essentialist approach, I argue that word-kinds are homeostatic property clusters, in line with the dominant approach to other biological and psychological kinds.

ABSTRACT The idea that two words can be instances of the same word is a central intuition in our conception of language. This fact underlies many of the claims that we make about how we communicate, and how we understand each other. Given this, irrespective of what we think words are, it is common to think that any putative ontology of words, must be able to explain this feature of language. That is, we need to provide criteria of identity for (...) word-types which allow us to individuate words such that it can be the case that two particular word-instances are instances of the same word-type. One solution, recently further developed by Irmak, holds that words are individuated by their history. In this paper, I argue that this view either fails to account for our intuitions about word identity, or is too vague to be a plausible answer to the problem of word individuation. (shrink)

Dennett’s story “Where am I?” is used to set up the difficulty of locating the self in the natural world. The story is told from a first-person point of view in which the narrator maintains his identity across exchanges of brain and body, but there is no physical thing in the story that can act as bearer of his identity. The story seems to present a dilemma between Cartesian dualism and Dennett’s a “no-self” view. This chapter argues for a third (...) option. Prepersonal processes in the brain stabilize separable conceptions of self and world out of patterns in sensory information. The conception of self starts out as a mere sensorimotor point of view but gradually develops into something richer. Seeing how the first-person point of view arises is seeing how the self arises, because the self is nothing but the proper subject of a first-person point of view. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of 'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and (...) the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kant's critical philosophy, namely the subject as 'revolving object'. It is only by presupposing - in a transcendentally realistic sense - that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the 'observer motion' of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall's book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kant's philosophy alike. (shrink)

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

This chapter discusses “conceptual evolution” and the role of the environment in maintaining an invariant link between thought and the world. It shows how coordination breaks down when one moves into unaccustomed circumstances, and describes a general technique for decoupling thought from context by developing an increasingly articulated representation of the causal fabric in which phenomenal states are embedded. It then recommends a generalization of Perry's vocabulary of unarticulated constituents. Finally, the chapter brings the discussion back around and incorporates this (...) into the general story of how the mind turns the fragile, fleeting links provided by experience into reliable, continuing connections that reach far into the spatial landscape and deeply into the circle of causes. (shrink)

A model is proposed which implicates molecular recognition systems as the major controlling factors in life cycle expression. It is envisaged that such systems are important in immune functioning and catabolic, metabolic molecule recognition at both inter- and intea-cellular level. These recognition systems have the following characteristics: Specific recognition molecules , e.g. vertebrate antibodies, invertebrate agglutinins and plant agglutinins may recognise specific substances, e.g. antigens, catabolic and metabolic molecules. The range of possible recognisable substances is very wide and variable. The (...) recognisers may themselves be recognised by other recognisers. Recognisers are usually produced in large amounts only on presentation of the appropriate recognisable molecule. The progressive introduction of new recognisable molecules increases the recogniser interaction, this interaction causing depression of some recogniser types and facilitation of other types among which may be recognisers specific for self components . Low juvenile viability is associated with a restricted range of available recognisers, high adult viability with increasing recogniser range and some auto-immunity/immune depression, senescence with a wide range of available recognisers and extensive auto-immunity/immune depression.Life cycle patterns and their control are discussed. It is suggested control mechanisms may include: Dietary restriction and in some periods complete nutritional abstinence. Specific recogniser depression, genes implicated here are the various antigens found on cell surfaces, in the serum and in various body fluids of vertebrates, e.g. ABO, MNSs, P, Rh, Le and other blood groups, the ABO and Le secretor antigens and the HL-A antigens. In addition the immune response and mixed lymphocyte culture loci are implicated. Finally life cycle control is discussed with relation to sexual selection. (shrink)

El artículo sitúa el Filioque en su contexto histórico y teológico, y reúne y analiza los principales pasajes de los escritos de Agustín en los que él propone la doctrina conocida como el Filioque, tratando desvelar su coherencia interna.

Called 'The Roman Socrates,' Musonius Rufus is a first-century Stoic philosopher who was famous for living and teaching the good life of virtue. This book describes his exemplary life, his ethical teachings, and the practical methods he used to educate people in the good life. Based on the ancient texts and modern scholarship, this book is the first comprehensive treatment of Musonius Rufus's life, teachings, and methods.